01 Nov DOL Expands Definition of ‘Fiduciary’
By Judy Ward
For the first time in a generation, the Labor Department has taken another crack at the definition of a fiduciary under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
The proposed rule was unveiled today by the Department of Labor (DoL), which noted that its adoption “would protect beneficiaries of pension plans and individual retirement accounts by more broadly defining the circumstances under which a person is considered to be a ‘fiduciary’ by reason of giving investment advice to an employee benefit plan or a plan’s participants.”
The proposed rule is designed to “take account of significant changes” in both the financial industry and what was described as “the expectations of plan officials and participants who receive investment advice,” as well as to protect participants from “conflicts of interest and self-dealing.”
In explaining the proposal, the Labor Department noted that while Section 3(21)(A) of ERISA provided a “simple two-part test for determining fiduciary status,” a subsequent (1975) regulation served to “significantly narrow” the “plain language” of the legislation; effectively replacing the two-part test that would impose fiduciary status when a person renders investment advice with respect to any moneys or other property of a plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so and receives payment (direct or indirect) for that advice, with a 5-part test that included conditions that: the advice regarding plan investments be rendered “on a regular basis,” that the advice would serve as a primary basis for investment decisions with respect to plan assets, that the recommendations are individualized for the plan, that the party making the recommendations receives a fee for such advice, and that it be pursuant to a mutual understanding of the parties. Moreover, the Labor Department noted that it further limited the definition of “investment advice” in a 1976 advisory opinion, when it concluded that the valuation of closely-held employer securities in an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) relied on in purchasing those securities would not constitute investment advice.
Well, that was then—and this is now, and the Labor Department noted that the financial marketplace and the types and complexity of services have expanded dramatically. The proposal notes that although professionals such as consultants, advisers, and appraisers “…significantly influence the decisions of plan fiduciaries, and have a considerable impact on plan investments,” if they are not deemed fiduciaries under ERISA “…they may operate with conflicts of interest that they need not disclose to the plan fiduciaries who expect impartiality and often must rely on their expertise, and have limited liability under ERISA for the advice they provide.”
In essence, the Labor Department now says that ERISA does not compel it to apply its own five-part test, and that new facts and circumstances mean it is now time to update the investment advice definition. Specifically cited is that the proposal no longer requires that the advice be provided on a “regular” basis, not does it require that there be a mutual understanding that the advice will serve as a primary basis for plan investment decisions.
As for what constitutes advice, the proposal now includes the provision of appraisals and fairness opinions as a type of advice, noting that the incorrect valuation of employer securities was a “common problem” identified in the DoL’s recent national enforcement project, including cases where plan fiduciaries have “reasonably relied on faulty valuations prepared by professional appraisers.” The proposal also makes specific reference to advice and recommendations as to the management of securities and other property, including such things as voting proxies or recommendations regarding the selection of persons to manage plan investments.
Finally, in what was described as reflecting “the Department’s longstanding interpretation of the current regulation,” the proposal makes clear that fiduciary status “may result from the provision of advice or recommendations not only to a plan fiduciary, but also to a plan participant or beneficiary.”